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Public healtha b s t r a c t
Societal biosecurity – measures built into everyday society to minimize risks from pests and diseases – is
an important aspect of managing epidemics and pandemics. We aimed to identify societal options for
reducing the transmission and spread of respiratory viruses. We used SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus 2) as a case study to meet the immediate need to manage the COVID-19 pan-
demic and eventually transition to more normal societal conditions, and to catalog options for managing
similar pandemics in the future. We used a ‘solution scanning’ approach. We read the literature; con-
sulted psychology, public health, medical, and solution scanning experts; crowd-sourced options using
social media; and collated comments on a preprint. Here, we present a list of 519 possible measures
to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission and spread. We provide a long list of options for policymakers and
businesses to consider when designing biosecurity plans to combat SARS-CoV-2 and similar pathogens
in the future. We also developed an online application to help with this process. We encourage testing
of actions, documentation of outcomes, revisions to the current list, and the addition of further options.
 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. IntroductionRespiratory viruses are known as a major global threat.1 They
have risen to the forefront of public attention through the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic, which presents an unprecedented global
challenge. As of 4 August 2021, there have been over 199 million
Fig. 1. A process for creating evidence-based guidance and plans, including biosecurity plans for SARS-CoV-2. Solution scanning is an initial stage for generating a reasonably
comprehensive set of options for consideration. Next, research evidence is rigorously reviewed, and models are created based on the available evidence. Guidance and plans
combine research with values, knowledge, and experience to provide the information needed for appropriate action. Action should ideally lead to feedback on the adopted
options, including their practicality, effectiveness, and off-target effects.
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worldwide.2
Managing a pandemic involves a combination of providing
medical care for those suffering from the disease, pharmaceutical
and clinical efforts such as testing drugs and developing vaccines,
logistics, such as organizing facilities for testing and delivery of
protective equipment, and a variety of societal biosecurity mea-
sures. Biosecurity risk management focuses on minimizing, as far
as possible, the probabilities of emergence, entry, establishment,
and spread of pests and diseases, and limiting the magnitude of
impacts within their extent of spread.3 ‘Societal biosecurity’ refers
to measures adopted within everyday society to achieve these
goals. Societal biosecurity is critical to compensate for limitations
in other approaches, such as shortages of medical equipment, the
time needed to develop and administer vaccines, and potential
vaccine ineffectiveness due to pathogen mutation and resistance.
Severe and disruptive societal biosecurity measures, such as
international travel bans and local or national lockdowns, have
been successfully used to manage ongoing COVID-19 epidemics
in many countries.4,5,6 In particular, lockdowns have been widely
used to ‘flatten the curve’ of infected cases to avoid overwhelming
healthcare systems. However, such severe measures have also had
serious economic and social consequences,7,8,9 so decision-makers
are keen to implement them for the shortest time possible. Thus, a
range of softer, less disruptive societal biosecurity measures, such
as physical distancing and wearing face masks, have also been
adopted. It is likely that some of these measures will remain in
place in the short to medium term, as we manage the ongoing pan-85demic and a safe transition to more normal societal conditions. For
example, while the global population is vaccinated against SARS-
CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; the cau-
sative agent of COVID-19), soft societal biosecurity measures may
help to mitigate the spread of novel viral variants and transmission
of the virus by vaccinated individuals.10,11 They may also be used
to cope with future seasonal resurgences of COVID-19.12 Some
measures may remain in place permanently or be reinstated, as
mitigation measures against future respiratory pathogens.
In any decision-making process (Fig. 1), it seems sensible to be
aware of the full range of possible measures. The aim of this study
was to catalog the range of practical societal biosecurity measures
relating to the transmission and spread of SARS-CoV-2. A compre-
hensive list of options should inform biosecurity plans that will
contribute to the management of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic
and the transition to more normal societal conditions over the
coming months and years. In the long term, it will provide a start-
ing point for managing future epidemics and pandemics involving
respiratory pathogens.
To explore the options, we performed a ‘solution scan’. The pro-
cess of solution scanning uses published research, existing guid-
ance, the experience of experts and practitioners, and
brainstorming (including crowd-sourcing) to identify a range of
potential solutions to a problem.13 This includes options that
may be ineffective, inconvenient, controversial, or have negative
side effects. Importantly, solution scans can identify options not
yet captured in the published literature (for novel or fast-moving
topics) or overlooked by the published literature (for established
W.J. Sutherland, N.G. Taylor, D.C. Aldridge et al. Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity 3 (2021) 84–90topics). Solution scans have been widely used to identify options to
maintain or enhance ecosystem services13 and interventions to
conserve biodiversity14,15,16, but the process can be applied to
problems in any discipline. Walsh et al.17 demonstrated how solu-
tion scans can broaden the range of options considered by
decision-makers: 92 conservation practitioners responsible for
addressing a problem were aware of only 57% of the possible inter-
ventions identified by a solution scan.2. Methods
2.1. Creating the list of options
The broad societal approaches for limiting transmission (small
scale, e.g., between individuals or within an office) and spread
(large scale, e.g., between cities or countries) of SARS-CoV-2 are
well-accepted. They include physical distancing, use of physical
barriers such as screens and masks, improved cleaning and
hygiene, and managing large-scale travel. The aim of our solution
scan was to explore more specific options for implementing such
approaches in practice.
Our scan began by soliciting input from the authors of this paper,
based on their knowledge and personal experience. The work was
initiated by those affiliated with BioRISC (Biosecurity Research Ini-
tiative at St Catharine’s College, Cambridge), Conservation Evidence
based in the Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, and
the Center for the Study of Existential Risk. The authorship group
was selected to include expertise in behavioral interventions, biose-
curity, business, disease transmission, the environment, epidemiol-
ogy, existential risks, medicine, pandemics, public health, public
policy, and solution scanning. Our scan was global in scope, but
we accept that there is some bias in the geographical coverage of
the authors (mostly from the Global North) and thatmeasures other
than those listed may be more appropriate in other contexts.
The authors’ knowledge and experience were supplemented by
ad hoc searches of the literature, crowdsourcing of ideas through
social media, and informal personal communications. The litera-
ture included peer-reviewed articles, preprints, guidance, govern-
ment policies and briefs, newspapers, and other popular media,
in a variety of languages (including Chinese, English, French, Ger-
man, Italian, Romanian and Spanish). A particular effort was made
to acquire information that complemented the authors’ experi-
ence, for example, by examining publications from countries or
regions with which we were less familiar.
The scanning process was initiated in March 2020. An initial list
of 275 options was published as a preprint18 and gathered consid-
erable media attention, leading to further suggestions of options
from policy-makers and the public. The list was refined and
expanded up to August 2021. We anticipate further updates to
the list of options on the website https://covid-19.biorisc.com.2.2. Scope
In considering societal measures that may reduce the transmis-
sion and spread of SARS-CoV-2, we specifically do not consider
pharmaceutical measures (e.g., drugs and vaccines) or measures
to reduce transmission in a clinical setting (e.g., patient manage-
ment and disinfection of medical equipment). We focus on reduc-
ing human–human transmission of an existing pathogen, rather
than preventing zoonotic spillover from wild animals into humans.
A parallel paper has been written to identify the means of reducing
the risk of new human pathogens emerging from wild and domes-
tic animals.19
Our audience is primarily governments, policy-makers, busi-
nesses, and other organizations considering how to reduce viral86transmission and spread during ongoing infection waves and tran-
sitions to more normal but pandemic-resilient societal conditions.
Researchers can use our list to stimulate primary research and evi-
dence synthesis.
We stress that we have generated a list of options to consider,
not recommendations, as we did not assess the effectiveness of
these options. Some measures might be ineffective at reducing
transmission risk or could even increase it, depending on the con-
text. For example, will limiting the number of items that can be pur-
chased at one time result in people shopping more frequently?
Does shutting pubs earlier in the evening reduce transmission or
increase it as people leave simultaneously and crowd together?
Nevertheless, we avoided listing options lacking any kind of credi-
ble evidence base,20 such as the idea of removing/destroying 5G
phone masts that circulated in the UK.21 Additionally, we did not
consider the consequences of these measures on anything other
than disease transmission or spread, or any means of mitigating
these consequences.Many of thesemeasures interact with environ-
mental, economic, and social issues such as civil rights, inclusivity,
justice, and the availability of medical resources (see Section 4.2).
3. Results
The full, current list of 519 societal options to reduce SARS-CoV-
2 transmission or spread is included as an appendix to this paper.
4. Discussion
Our solution scan can inform the selection of appropriate soci-
etal biosecurity measures against the transmission and spread of
SARS-CoV-2 (Fig. 1). The measures can be incorporated into biose-
curity guidance and plans for immediate crisis management (e.g.,
surges of infected cases), long-term management of ongoing epi-
demics, and the design of a future pandemic-resilient society.
Although we used SARS-CoV-2 as a case study, we expect that
many of the measures are transferable to future epidemics or pan-
demics caused by pathogens transmitted or spread through similar
pathways.22 We discuss below how our list of options fits into the
biosecurity planning process.
4.1. Designing biosecurity plans: identifying risks
Before considering possible measures to mitigate risks,
decision-makers should identify high-risk areas and pathways.
For respiratory viruses, such as SARS-CoV-2, transmission through
direct or close contact with infected individuals appears critical.23
Therefore, it is sensible to prioritize the application of measures to
mitigate the risk posed by close interactions, especially in enclosed
spaces. Transmission through contaminated items is also possi-
ble,24 so decision-makers should identify specific items or inter-
faces that pose the highest risk in the situation being analyzed,
perhaps because they are widely shared25 or composed of a certain
material.26 At a larger scale, genomic analyses can be used to map
out viral spread and key transmission routes.27 Key areas and path-
ways will be somewhat context-dependent, varying over time and
between settings (e.g., office building vs. nightclub, or countries
with different cultural practices). A precautionary approach may
be prudent when there is uncertainty in the importance of path-
ways in facilitating transmission, especially in the early stages of
dealing with a disease.
4.2. Designing biosecurity plans: identifying options
Once the key risks have been identified, decision-makers should
select relevant and practical measures to tackle them. Our list of
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problem, the long list of options will quickly be whittled down to
a much shorter list of candidate options based purely on relevance
and practicality alone (Box 1). The online application at https://
alecchristie888.shinyapps.io/Covid_19_options/ was designed to
help with this. The shortlisted options should be further assessed
(Fig. 1) taking into account factors such as likely effectiveness,
off-target consequences, cost, legality, fairness, social acceptability,
likely compliance, and coherence with other measures within guid-
ance or plans. We reiterate that the list of options does not include
information on these factors:manywill be very context-dependent,
and at the time of writing, many lack a published evidence base.
Ideally, effectiveness should be assessed using robust evidence,
not simply intuition. Behavioralmeasures that seem intuitively sen-
siblemaynotactuallywork:providingfinancial incentives for adults
to attend literacy classes, for example, can actually reduce atten-
dance.28,29 Systematic reviews of evidence, such as those provided
by the Oxford COVID-19 Evidence Service (https://www.cebm.net/
oxford-covid-19/) or listed in the Cochrane Library (https://
www.cochranelibrary.com/covid-19), often provide the most reli-
able and comprehensive assessment of effectiveness. Rapid reviews,
synopses, orotherevidence-basedguidance (e.g., reducing risksdur-
ing food shopping at www.flattenthecurve.com) can also be useful,
especially when there are temporal or financial limitations. Expert
opinioncanbeauseful supplement toexistingpublishedevidence.30Box 1 Creating a context-specific shortlist from the master list
of options As a hypothetical example, consider the possi-
ble measures for reopening a museum that was shut because
of severe crowding. How can the museum be safely reo-
pened, minimizing the risk of transmission due to close inter-
actions? The solution scan provides a range of options that
may reduce the frequency or duration of close interactions,
from which a shortlist can be made (10 here) largely based
on relevance and practicality. The shortlist should then be
subjected to further consideration on likely effectiveness,
compliance, costs, and any negative consequences (e.g.,
regarding public relations or social equity). At this stage,
the latest guidance, such as that from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) or the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), should be consulted.
1. Remove, block off or close facilities that encourage
groups to form (e.g., benches).
2. Limit time inside shared space.
3. Require pre-booking of time slots to use or enter
facilities.
4. Provide access to alternative spaces (e.g., free access
to museums that normally charge admission).
5. Provide virtual reality alternatives to visits outside the
home (e.g., virtual museums).
6. Encourage people to observe physical distancing, with
effective messaging.
7. Provide wearable items that mark out safe distances
between individuals.
8. Encourage or require walking in one direction (e.g.,
clockwise) around shared spaces.
8. Clearly separate entrances and exits.
10. At congested entry points give directions for users to
alternate who goes next from a physically-distanced queue
on each side.87In the absence of a collated body of evidence testing practical
measures, pragmatic decisions need to be made. For example, dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic, supermarkets were faced with clear
evidence-based advice to increase the physical distance between
individuals, and there was evidence of increased risk to vulnerable
groups. They applied a series of measures including one-way sys-
tems, markings on the floor to encourage spacing, prioritizing
home delivery to vulnerable groups, and restricting the first hour
of opening each day to vulnerable groups and caregivers. There
was little evidence on the effectiveness of these specific measures,
but since there was a need to act urgently, we consider this
approach to be highly appropriate. Where there is a limited evi-
dence base, implementing and testing alternative strategies can
be highly valuable, especially when the results are shared with
other decision-makers.
Beyond effectiveness in reducing disease transmission, it is
important to consider the local socio-ecological context when
selecting appropriate measures. For example, current medical care
capacity may define the appropriate severity of intervention: the
initial public health response to SARS-CoV-2 in Lebanon was more
stringent than that in South Korea, because medical resources were
more limited in Lebanon.31 Moreover, many of our listed measures
involve trade-offs between effects on disease transmission and
other biological, social, economic, and environmental issues. Isola-
tion can have severe mental and physical implications.7 Limiting
the number of staff that can work simultaneously may affect
household income. Encouraging the use of single-use materials
may lead to environmental pollution.32 These trade-offs must be
weighed when selecting measures, and there must be some cen-
tralization to ensure that specific biosecurity plans do not uninten-
tionally undermine broader policies. Measures that are likely to
cause significant distress or are unlikely to generate sufficient com-
pliance may not be justifiable. This may be the case when the social
costs of restrictions are not borne equally by all members of soci-
ety. For example, closing places of worship will be highly distress-
ing for some people, while for others, it will have no impact. Shifts
to online activities may present a disadvantage to those without
access to technology or with less confidence in using it.
The measures within biosecurity plans and how those measures
are implemented will also vary over time as priorities shift
between controlling transmission and allowing activities to
resume. However, measures introduced during a pandemic may
be maintained during the transition to a more normal society.
For example, temperature screening has continued within China
and has facilitated the identification of new infections before sub-
stantial spread in a number of cities. Physical distancing and wear-
ing face masks in public have become a routine part of daily life
around the world.33,34 In many countries, the transition in and
out of severe measures has been phased, for example, by region,
age group, or socioeconomic activity.4.3. Reporting back on implemented options
Once measures have been implemented, it is desirable to report
on their effects on disease transmission and spread, off-target or
side effects, and practicality (Fig. 1). Reporting will improve future
assessments and the targeted selection of options.
For some options, the appropriate outcome for judging effec-
tiveness is the level of disease transmission or spread itself. For
example, some evidence suggests that closing public spaces (espe-
cially schools and universities), banning gatherings, and interna-
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icant reduction in SARS-CoV-2 transmission.35,36 Similarly, a study
in China found that regularly cleaning surfaces with chlorine- or
ethanol-based disinfectants significantly reduced SARS-CoV-2
transmission within households.37
However, the high resolution of many of the options in our list
means that intermediate outcomes, such as human behavior, the
contact rate, or the presence of viable virus in the environment,
might be more realistic outcomes by which to monitor effects. Fur-
ther evidence or theory links these outcomes to viral transmission
and spread. For example, there is strong evidence from labora-
tory38,39 and epidemiological40,41 studies that wearing face masks
reduces the risk of contracting COVID-19. The appropriate outcome
for judging the effectiveness of many options to increase the effec-
tive use of face masks (Appendix Section 2.3) is whether they
increase the number of people wearing face masks in the correct
manner. To this end, an observational study in Guatemala found
that the proportion of people correctly wearing face masks
increased after the introduction of a mandatory mask mandate.42
Options that appear to be less effective based on behavioral out-
comes (at least in some specific cases) include providing hand san-
itizer stations and installing one-way systems, which have been
infrequently used or ignored in bars in Scotland,43 and encouraging
self-isolation of close contacts, which may have pushed people to
delete contact tracing apps in the UK.44
Many of the specific options in our list remain insufficiently
tested, or untested, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Evi-
dence could be co-opted from other similar pathogens or diseases
or from the wider behavioral science literature. When carrying out
new studies, it is desirable to evaluate the individual effects of
interventions. Simultaneous implementation of multiple interven-
tions during the COVID-19 pandemic makes this challenging in
post hoc analyses.35 Studies should also consider evaluating both
the overall measure (e.g., encouraging hand washing) and different
ways of implementing it (e.g., different poster designs to encourage
hand washing45). The effectiveness of public health messages can
depend strongly on the way in which they are framed, for example,
whether they appeal to fear or empathy, and the cultural relevance
of the delivery.46,47
During the COVID-19 pandemic, clinical practitioners have been
sharing their implementation experience and inventing means of
improving procedures,48 andwe encourage those involved in public
health to do the same. Returning to our supermarket example, open
questions surrounding the implementation of measures include:
Does trust work when specifying shopping hours for vulnerable
groups or is identification needed? Are markings sufficient for a
one-way system or are barriers also essential? Are boxes or spots
more effective at encouraging physical distancing in queues? Do
people in queues now distance themselves automatically without
marking? How can the usual one-way system design be improved?
4.4. Outlook
Our solution scan has already contributed to biosecurity
decision-making around the world. It can continue to inform biose-
curity planning for SARS-CoV-2, as vaccines are rolled out globally
and in response to future resurgence of the virus. In the long term,
we anticipate that our catalog of options will be a useful starting
point when considering biosecurity management of novel respira-
tory viruses. Indeed, measures meant to manage SARS-CoV-2
transmission have reduced the incidence of respiratory diseases
such as seasonal influenza.49 We encourage research into the effec-
tiveness, off-target effects, and practicality of the listed options to
generate the evidence that is a key part of the biosecurity planning
process (Fig. 1). We also encourage the identification of further
options to reduce the transmission and spread of SARS-CoV-2,88including modifications to existing options and addition of com-
pletely novel ideas, and provide a framework for collating these
(contact: biorisc@caths.cam.ac.uk). Similar solution-scanning exer-
cises could be carried out in other fields, such as minimizing the
economic, mental, and physical health and social consequences
of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the challenges
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